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I have always thought of Sidman’s classic 
text, known affectionately as Tactics (1960), 
as primarily a philosophy of science text. I 
was surprised to learn that Sidman himself 
did not see it as particularly relevant to the 
philosophy of science (Sidman 2011, this 
volume).  It appears that since 1960 Sidman 
has been busy doing his ground-breaking 
basic and applied work unaware of his status 
as a philosopher of science, at least to some 
of us. This is surprising, because on reading 
the Remarks series, it is apparent that Sidman 
does not reside at the centre of our science, 
but at the very edge.  No good behavioral 
engineer can push the boundaries of their 
own discipline, as Sidman has done, without 
a keen appreciation of the philosophy of 
their science. 
  Contained within Sidman’s Re-
marks are superb illustrations of the radical 
behaviorist’s approach to behavior.  These 
illustrations draw upon a nuanced apprecia-
tion of our basic units of analysis that one 
rarely encounters in daily practice.  However, 
there is a consistent and important theme 
running through these papers regarding the 
inferential nature of behavioral units.  On 
several occasions, explicitly and implicitly, 
Sidman raises the crucial matter of stimulus 
control as an inference (e.g., Sidman, 1977a). 
Indeed, there is nothing in the behavioristic 
formulation that requires behavioral units to 
be anything more tangible than an inference. 
He argues that unless we accept that stimulus 
control is an inference (a discrimination of 
the effectiveness of our own experimental 
manipulations across time), we may be 
seduced into seeking mediational accounts 
to explain stimulus-stimulus relations (e.g., 
such as stimulus equivalence).  Seeking a me-
diational account is surplus to requirements 
and Sidman clearly sees that seeking one will 
hamstring the development of stimulus con-
trol based accounts of cognition, in which he 
shows a keen interest.  Sidman summarized 
the idea as follows; 
…  we can never see a controlling relation, with 
surety.  We can only infer its existence actuarially 
and post hoc after a number of instances have per-
mitted us to rule out other controlling relations 
(emphasis in original; 1977a, p 280).
Sidman speaks loosely of stimuli and 
responses in other passages, suggesting that 
perhaps these particular behavioral units are 
in fact not inferences.  For example in one 
passage he says; 
We can, of course, observe and measure a single 
instance of any stimulus, but we can never know 
except by inference whether we are actually ob-
serving a particular controlling relational between 
two stimuli or between a stimulus and response. 
Unlike individual stimuli and responses, control-
ling relations are not directly observable (1979, 
p. 123).  
However, this would appear to be lan-
guage of convenience.  Stimuli and responses 
are, of course, themselves classes that must be 
discriminated across multiple observations. 
In other words, they too must be inferred 
(i.e., they are functional units).  While in-
stances of a stimulus may be observable, 
the stimulus itself is not (i.e., it is a class). 
In another passage from the Remarks series 
Sidman clarifies the foregoing issue while 
discussing the foundational co-definition of 
stimuli and responses.
If neither stimulus nor response can be defined 
except circularly, each by reference to the other, 
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then neither of them alone can constitute our 
fundamental unit. The unit must include both. 
Behavior is not to be equated only with responses, 
but must include the relation of responses to 
controlling stimuli (1978 p. 266; see also Skin-
ner, 1938, p. 9). 
This final statement is profoundly im-
portant, and leads to the conclusion that 
behavior may not the observable activity 
of organisms (what many of us may loosely 
think of as “responses”).  This radical im-
plication that I am inferring from Sidman’s 
remarks are perhaps best summarized by his 
observations of the location of behavior.  
Perhaps  the learner’s performance is not the criti-
cal datum at all.  For example, if the occurrence 
or nonoccurrence of errors merely specifies a rela-
tion between the behavior of the learner and the 
teacher, perhaps theories of learning should stress 
the behavior of teachers rather than of learners” 
(emphasis in original; 1977a, p 112-113).
The point is made again in his 1979 
paper.
Learning curves might just as well be called 
teaching curves, for they allow us to infer at least 
as much about the behavior of experimenters as 
about the behavior of subjects (1979, p. 125).
These comment leave us in no doubt that 
behavioral units are not to be bound by the 
observable activity of our subjects. They are 
spatio-temporally extended units based on 
inference made across time (see also Hull, 
1984; Roche & Barnes, 1997).  
While a distinction between behavior and 
organismic activity may seem unintuitive, 
it is in fact crucial if we are to competently 
address the matter of complex forms of de-
rived relational responding, which patently 
involves overarching classes of responses, 
defined non-topographically, but rather 
relationally. Based on our community’s for-
mer reluctance to entertain the concept of 
stimulus-stimulus relations in the absence 
of mediation, and some current resistance 
to the possibility of more complex stimulus-
stimulus relations, such as complex derived 
relational responding (i.e., relational frames), 
it would appear that many of us do not in 
practice appreciate the spatio-temporally 
extended nature of operant units and the 
inferential nature of stimulus control. Sid-
man’s insights bring us face-to-face with the 
profoundly simply, but infinitely expansive 
and abstracted nature of our behavioral units. 
Behavioral units incorporate instances, but 
they are not them.
Sidman expressly raised these issues 
in the context of arguing for the need for 
stimulus control analyses of cognitive phe-
nomena.  But I wonder if he appreciates 
that once the break has been made between 
functional behavioral units and the discrete 
topographies of organismic movement that 
participate in those units, there is no end to 
the forms of complex behavior that can be 
brought into our remit as experimental ana-
lysts of behavior. The remit is much broader 
than stimulus-stimulus relations defined in 
terms of functional equivalence or mutual 
substitutability (i.e., stimulus equivalence). 
Once the operant and its constituent parts 
have been freed from the constraints of 
observable discrete activities, the operant 
expands spatio-temporally to infinity. That 
is, if mediation is not required to validate 
stimulus control measures, and if response 
classes are not defined by topography, then 
any pattern of response forms that is func-
tionally related to any pattern of stimulus 
forms constitutes a stimulus-response rela-
tion.  Similarly, any pattern of stimulus-
stimulus relation, whether it is takes the 
form of functional equivalence or not, can 
constitute a legitimate basis for stimulus 
control.  For instance, the observation that 
a subject can always choose from a range 
of comparison stimuli, the one that is 
“greater than” a sample stimulus, requires 
no mediational account, and the novelty of 
the stimulus forms employed in such a test 
does not pose a threat to the integrity of an 
account based on generalized relational re-
sponding in accordance with a “comparative 
relation” (i.e., the language of Relational 
Frame Theory; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001).   
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Sidman may not have until recently 
thought of his Tactics as relevant to the 
philosophy of science.  It seems to me that 
he was amongst the last to know! To me 
Sidman was always a Philosopher; literally 
a lover of knowledge.  He has also been 
mentor-at-a-distance to countless numbers 
of us attempting to practice and improve our 
science.  But I am heartened that Sidman has 
finally voiced his interest in philosophical 
matters, and reminded our community of 
behavioral engineers that not all questions 
are empirical ones. 
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